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Foreword
In 2005, the Rockwool Foundation decided to initiate, through its Research Unit, 
a project that would investigate the signifi cance for the Danish labour market of 
the immigration of foreign labour. Such a project became especially relevant in 
light of the enlargement of the EU in 2004 to include a number of Eastern Eu-
ropean countries. Moreover, the immigration of labour and integration into the 
labour market have always constituted one of the most highly prioritised areas 
of research for the Foundation.
The Research Unit then entered into a collaboration agreement with the Cen-
tre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR) at the Copenhagen Business 
School. Nikolaj Malchow-Møller (Director of Research), Jakob Roland Munch 
(Associate Professor) and Jan Rose Skaksen (Professor), all of CEBR, then car-
ried out the major task of collecting and analysing the available data.
This publication at a midway stage of the project presents some of the main 
results concerning the consequences of immigration for the wages of Danish 
workers. We focus in particular on some of the potential consequences of im-
migration that are often overlooked in the literature. These concern the short-
term costs of immigration to Danish workers currently in employment. Are 
there indeed such costs associated with adaptation to the new situation? And 
if there are, then who gains and who loses in the short term with respect to 
wage formation?
Since the immigration of labour in connection with the enlargement of the EU 
has only been going on for a short while, it has only been possible to trace the 
consequences of immigration until the end of 2004 in the present working  paper, 
and, of course, the EU enlargement only accounts for a small part of the effects 
of immigration up to that point.
In addition to the researchers mentioned above, I would like to thank Vibeke 
Borchsenius, Jonas Helth Lønborg and David Tønners for their extremely com-
petent research assistance. My thanks also go to Assistant Professor Anna Piil 
Damm (University of Aarhus), Professor Christian Dustmann (University Col-
lege London), Professor Peder J. Pedersen (University of Aarhus) and Associate 
Professor Michael Svarer (University of Aarhus) for their expert commentary 
on the researchers’ analyses.
I would also like to mention the contribution of Mai-britt Sejberg of the Research 
Unit, who has been responsible for proof-reading the text.
As always with the Research Unit’s projects, this research has been carried out 
in complete academic independence and free from the infl uence of any party, 
including the Rockwool Foundation itself. The Foundation has, however, with its 
usual dependability, provided the project with the necessary resources, and the 
research group and I are indebted to the staff of the Foundation, including the 
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Director, Elin Schmidt, and the Board and their chair Tom Kähler. Our  warmest 
thanks go to them for their support and cooperation.
Copenhagen, October 2007     Torben Tranæs
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Abstract: We propose a complementary approach to analyze the impact of im-
migration on the wages of native workers. Using linked employer-employee data 
from Denmark for a relatively long time period (1993-2004), we study the con-
sequences of an increased use of immigrants at the most disaggregate level – the 
workplace. We fi nd that an increase in the share of workers from less developed 
countries at the workplace has a signifi cantly negative effect on the wages of 
natives – also when controlling for potential endogeneity using both fi xed ef-
fects and IV. The use of immigrants from more developed countries also ap-
pears to be correlated with wages. However, these correlations disappear when 
controlling for unobserved fi rm and worker characteristics and are thus likely 
to refl ect selection rather than a causal effect of these immigrants. Finally, we 
fi nd a positive impact on the wages of native workers from having Eastern Eu-
ropean co-workers.
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1. Introduction
In recent decades, many developed countries have experienced marked increases 
in immigration. As a result, there has been a renewed interest in the economic 
consequences of immigration. Although the issue is controversial, it is fair to 
say that most studies have found it hard to document strong effects. In this pa-
per, we propose a complementary analysis of the impact of immigration on the 
wages of native workers by focusing on the effects of an increased use of immi-
grants at the most disaggregate level – the workplace.
A substantial empirical literature has studied the impact of immigration on the 
wages of native workers at a more aggregate level. One approach has been to 
exploit differences in the infl ows of immigrants across regional labour markets 
to estimate the effects of immigration on the wages of native workers; see, e.g., 
Altonji and Card (1991) as well as Zorlu and Hartog (2005) for a more recent 
example.1 Another approach is taken by Borjas (2003, 2006) who partitions the 
labour market into skill groups instead of geographic areas and regresses the 
earnings of native workers on the immigrant supply shocks for each skill group. 
Yet another route followed in the literature is the so-called factor proportions ap-
proach where estimated substitution elasticities between native workers and im-
migrants are used to simulate the consequences of immigration. This approach 
sometimes yields signifi cantly negative wage effects for low-skilled native work-
ers; see, e.g., Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997), while others fi nd very limited 
or even positive effects; see, e.g., Ottaviano and Peri (2005).
The aggregate approaches may, however, hide effects at the more local level. 
Thus, native workers within a given skill-group or a given geographic area may 
be affected differently by immigrant workers, depending on how “close” they 
are to these workers. One possibility – which we investigate in this paper – is 
that native workers employed in fi rms that hire immigrants are affected differ-
ently than otherwise similar native workers.
Our hypothesis is that fi rms using immigrant workers may improve (or wors-
en) their bargaining position towards native workers, which results in lower (or 
higher) wages for these workers. There exists solid evidence that rent sharing 
between fi rms and workers takes place in imperfectly competitive labour mar-
kets, see, e.g., Blanchfl ower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996), Hildretch and Oswald 
(1997) and Arai (2003), which leaves plenty of room for such workplace specifi c 
bargaining effects of immigration.
Such local effects will not be captured – or only to a limited extent – by using 
one of the more aggregate approaches, as many of the local effects are likely 
to net out at the aggregate level. Furthermore, even the average effect within a 
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1. To avoid problems with endogeneity of the immigrant supply change, some studies have relied on natural 
experiments, with the prominent examples being Card’s (1990) study of the Mariel Boatlift and the mass im-
migration of Jews from the former Soviet Union to Israel (Eckstein and Weiss, 2004).
given skill group is hard to capture by considering the resulting average wage, 
since part of the effects will have a temporary nature. For example, native work-
ers affected adversely by an immigrant infl ow in the fi rm may move to other 
fi rms (where the wage is less affected by immigration). This move is typically 
associated with signifi cant adjustment costs in the form of temporary unemploy-
ment and other search costs, which are not captured by looking at the resulting 
wage. For theses reasons, we have to look at the wages of the native workers in 
the fi rms where immigrants are hired.
The analysis is made possible by the use of linked employer-employee data for 
a relatively long time period (1993-2004) from a country (Denmark) that has 
experienced a particularly pronounced increase in the infl ux of immigrants. As 
we have observations on all individuals in the Danish labour market, we are 
able to construct very detailed measures of the use of immigrants at the work-
place level.
An alternative explanation behind any negative correlation between the wages 
of native workers and the use of immigrants at the workplace may, of course, be 
that certain types of fi rms both attract many immigrants and pay lower wages, 
or that certain native workers select into workplaces with a high share of immi-
grants. There is also a possibility that immigrants are attracted towards fi rms 
that pay higher wages. We control for such potential biases using fi xed effects 
at both the individual and the workplace level as well as by instrumenting the 
use of immigrants by historical information on immigrant use at the workplace, 
corrected for local trends in immigration.
We fi nd that the share of immigrants from less developed countries has a signifi -
cantly negative effect on wages – also when controlling for potential endogene-
ity problems using both fi xed effects and IV. The result is very robust to these 
checks. The use of immigrants from more developed countries also appears to 
be correlated with wages. These correlations, however, disappear when control-
ling for unobserved fi rm and worker characteristics and are thus likely to refl ect 
selection rather than a causal effect of these immigrants. Finally, workers from 
the new EU countries from Eastern Europe tend to increase the wages of native 
workers once endogeneity of the immigration variables is taken into account.
Note that the effects identifi ed in this paper do not preclude any overall positive 
or negative effects of immigration on a given skill-group or geographic area. We 
do only attempt to identify differences between native workers who are exposed 
differently to immigration at the most local level – the workplace.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Data are presented in Section 2. 
In Section 3, we outline the empirical strategy, and in Section 4, we present the 
estimation results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2. Data
From the Integrated Database of Labour Market Research (IDA), we hold in-
formation on all Danish residents in the period 1980-2004.2 From IDA, we fi rst 
extract information about individual characteristics for a 5 % sample of work-
ers for the years 1993-2004.3 We restrict the sample to include only full-time 
private sector native workers in the age of 18-65 years from workplaces with at 
least 10 employees. Second, this sample is merged with individual information 
on income from the Income Registers in Statistics Denmark for the same peri-
od. Third, the whole population of full-time employees aged 18-65 from IDA is 
used to construct a number of workplace (and regional) characteristics such as 
the share of immigrants. These are subsequently merged on to the 5 % sample 
of workers, as all individuals in IDA are linked to workplaces. After eliminat-
ing the observations in the upper and lower 0.5 percentiles of the wage distribu-
tion, the fi nal data set for 1993-2004 contains 543,089 observations from 85,892 
workers and 42,891 workplaces.
The hourly wage rate is the dependent variable used in the analyses to follow. 
The wage rate is calculated as total labor income plus mandatory pension pay-
ments divided by the total number of hours worked in any given year.4 The mea-
sure for total labor income as such is highly reliable as it comes from the tax au-
thorities. However, it is important to take pension payments into account. They 
have been rising since their introduction in the early 1990s, but not in a uniform 
manner across the labour market.
A number of individual socioeconomic characteristics are used as control vari-
ables in the analyses. There is information about age, gender, marital status, the 
presence of children aged 0-6 years in the household, city size, labour market 
experience, tenure and education.5 Descriptive statistics for a selected set of these 
variables are presented in Table 1.
In addition to the variables listed in Table 1, we include individual information 
on industry of work (19 different industries) and region of residence (51 regions, 
defi ned from observed commuting patterns) in the analyses.
With respect to workplace characteristics, we use a variable for the size of the 
workplace in terms of the number of employees along with a number of variables 
measuring the composition of the workplace workforce. Table 2 summarises the 
main workplace level variables averaged over workplaces in 2004. Similar vari-
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2. For more details on the IDA data see Abowd and Kramarz (1999).
3. Each person present in the period 1993-2004 is given the same probability of being sampled. For the sam-
pled workers, we use observations on all years for which they are employed.
4. It should be mentioned that a measurement error could arise as potential overtime work is not included in 
the registered number of hours worked.
5. Information about workplace tenure only goes back to 1980, so an indicator variable for left censored ten-
ure is included.
ables measuring the composition of employees at the regional level are also con-
structed and used in the analyses, but not reported in Table 2.
Of particular importance is the defi nition of immigrants used in the paper. Im-
migrants are defi ned as individuals born outside Denmark with non-Danish par-
ents, i.e. parents without Danish citizenship or born outside Denmark. If no in-
formation is available on the parents, an individual born abroad is also considered 
an immigrant. As a consequence, in the group of native persons, we include all 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Individual Characteristics, 1993-04
Mean Std dev Min Max
Age 18-24 0.10 0.30 0 1
Age 25-29 0.13 0.34 0 1
Age 30-39 0.31 0.46 0 1
Age 40-49 0.25 0.43 0 1
Age 50-59 0.19 0.39 0 1
Age 60-65 0.03 0.16 0 1
Female 0.33 0.47 0 1
Married 0.54 0.50 0 1
Children 0-6 0.23 0.42 0 1
Experience 16.58 9.56 0 41
Tenure 4.55 5.28 0 24
Tenure censored 0.06 0.24 0 1
Basic education 0.36 0.48 0 1
Vocational education 0.48 0.50 0 1
Further education 0.16 0.37 0 1
Copenhagen 0.21 0.41 0 1
Large city 0.14 0.34 0 1
Small city 0.66 0.48 0 1
Number of person-years 543,089
Table 2: Summary Statistics: Workplace Characteristics, 2004
Mean Std dev Min Max % with value=0
log (# employees) 3.45 0.90 2.30 8.37
Female share 0.33 0.27 0.00 1.00
Share with basic education 0.32 0.19 0.00 1.00
Share with vocational education 0.51 0.60 0.00 1.00
Share with further education 0.17 0.21 0.00 1.00
Share aged 40-65 0.46 0.21 0.00 1.00
Immigrant type 1 share 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.75 72.69
Immigrant type 2 share 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.39 92.28
Immigrant type 3 share 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.71 82.35
Immigrant type 4 share 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.87 74.49
Number of workplaces in 2004 16,823
individuals born in Denmark, irrespectively of the status of the parents, as well 
as individuals born abroad when at least one parent is Danish.
It may be important to distinguish between different types of immigrants as 
some immigrants may have come to Denmark for job-related reasons while oth-
ers may have come for, e.g., personal or political reasons (refugees). Employment 
related immigration may be particularly relevant for immigrants from the old 
EU-countries and the other Nordic countries. As a consequence, in the analyses 
to follow, we distinguish between four different groups of origin countries for 
the immigrants: i) EU-15 countries plus Norway and Iceland; ii) The 10 new EU 
countries as of May 1, 2004; iii) All remaining developed countries according 
to the UN defi nition; and iv) All remaining countries, i.e. countries from less 
developed regions according to the UN defi nition.6 Note that the origin country 
of an immigrant is defi ned from the parents’ countries of birth (or citizenship) 
whenever that information is available. That is, an individual born by Swedish 
parents in Germany is considered Swedish.
Denmark is an interesting case to study since it is one of the European coun-
tries that has experienced the strongest relative increase in immigration. Figure 
1 shows the development in the four groups of immigrants in the period 1993-
2004 in Denmark. This is also a period of maintained employment growth in 
the Danish economy.
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Figure 1: Share of Immigrants Among Employed Workers
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6. The UN defi nition is available at http://esa.un.org/unpp/defi nition.html. The last group also includes im-
migrants with unknown origins.
Information on immigrant type is used to construct variables measuring the 
workplace (and regional) shares of the different types of immigrants among the 
employees. Summary statistics of the workplace level variables are included in 
the lower part of Table 2. Notice that for each immigrant type, only a minor part 
of the workplaces employ immigrants.
As a fi rst indication of a relationship between the workplace immigrant shares 
and the wages of native workers, Table 3 presents average wages for differ-
ent educational groups of native workers in 2004. We observe that workplaces 
with immigrants tend to pay higher wages to native workers. This holds for all 
types of immigrants and across all education levels. Thus, the raw relationship 
between immigrant share and the wages of native workers seems to suggest a 
complementarity.
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Table 3: Immigrant Shares and Outcomes for Native Workers, 2004
 =0 >0  =0 >0  =0 >0  =0 >0
Av. Log(wage), basic education 5.03 5.15 5.07 5.16 5.06 5.13 5.06 5.12
Av. Log(wage), vocational education 5.18 5.24 5.20 5.25 5.20 5.23 5.19 5.23
Av. Log(wage), further education 5.38 5.50 5.43 5.52 5.42 5.50 5.42 5.50
Av. Log(# of Employees) 3.17 4.16 3.34 4.65 3.26 4.33 3.19 4.18
Av. Share with basic education 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.32 0.36 0.31 0.37
Av. Share with vocational education 0.54 0.44 0.52 0.42 0.53 0.45 0.54 0.44
Av. Share with further education 0.14 0.22 0.16 0.22 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.18
Immigrant type 1 share Immigrant type 2 share Immigrant type 3 share Immigrant type 4 share
3. Theory and Empirical Strategy
As noted above, the traditional approach to analyse the relationship between im-
migration and the wages of native workers has been to focus on the immigrant 
share in the local labour market, which is appropriate in studies of the overall 
impact on the wage structure. However, this approach may mask effects at the 
more disaggregate level. There may be direct individual implications of having 
immigrant co-workers at the workplace; implications that are possible to un-
cover using micro data for workers and workplaces. In this case, the variable of 
interest is the workplace immigrant share and its impact on wages of individual 
native workers.7
In a perfectly competitive labour market, workers with identical qualifi cations 
should get the same wage, irrespectively of where they work. In that case, there 
should be no effects of the workplace immigrant share. In contrast, if the la-
bour market is imperfectly competitive and fi rms earn rents, there may be room 
for fi rm- or workplace-specifi c wages when fi rms and workers share the rents. 
There exists considerable evidence of such rent sharing taking place; see, e.g., 
Blanchfl ower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996), Hildretch and Oswald (1997) and Arai 
(2003). This leaves room for fi rm specifi c characteristics to play a role for in-
dividual wages.
The idea here is that fi rms using many immigrants may see their bargaining po-
sition vis-à-vis native workers improve (or worsen). A higher immigrant share 
reduces the size of the original native insider group and hence the bargaining 
power of this group. Below, we set up a simple stylized model to show this point. 
It should be emphasized that the model is for illustrative purposes only – we do 
not attempt any subsequent structural estimation. This is followed by a descrip-
tion of the estimation procedure.
3.1 A Simple Stylized Model
We assume that native workers and immigrants are two distinct types of labour. 
First, immigrants do not possess the same skills as native workers. For example, 
they may not master the language as well as native workers. Therefore, when hir-
ing immigrants, a fi rm has to make an investment – either in training the immi-
grants or in new technology to accommodate the missing skills of immigrants. 
Second, we assume that native workers are insiders in the labour market. They 
are organized in trade unions which bargain with fi rms over employment and 
wages at the fi rm level. The immigrants, on the other hand, are outsiders. Their 
interests are not represented in the trade union.
7. Of course, the more disaggregate approach is not independent of local labour market developments as 
fi rms in areas with a relatively high immigrant share will tend to have high workplace immigrant ratios. Con-
sequently, in the empirical analysis, we will also condition on local labour market immigration ratios.
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We consider a single fi rm with a revenue function given by
(1)
where L
N
 and L
I
 are the employments of native workers and immigrants, re-
spectively, and a < 1 is the productivity of immigrants relative to native work-
ers. We assume that R' > 0 and R'' < 0 . Thus, the marginal revenue is assumed 
to be positive but decreasing.
The profi t of the fi rm is:
(2)
where w
N
 is the wage of native workers, and w
I
 is the (exogenous) wage of im-
migrants. F represents fi xed costs.
The pay-off to the trade union organising the native workers is assumed to be 
the total income of trade union members:
(3)
where M (≥ L
N
) is the number of trade union members (insiders), and w is the 
income of the trade union members who do not achieve employment in the fi rm. 
This could be unemployment benefi ts or wages in other fi rms (less transaction 
and search costs).
Since the employment of immigrants requires investments, we assume that the 
fi rm fi rst decides on how many immigrants to hire. Next, the fi rm and the trade 
union determine wages and employment of native workers. As the purpose of 
this section is solely to illustrate how the employment of immigrants may af-
fect the wages of native workers, we do not explicitly consider how the fi rm de-
cides upon how many immigrants to hire. We simply assume that the fi rm has 
decided to “invest” in L
I
 immigrants, and we then consider how this affects the 
native workers.
The outcome of the bargaining over the wage and employment of native work-
ers, (w*N , L*N ), is assumed to be given by the Nash-product; see, e.g., McDonald 
and Solow (1981). I.e.
(4)
where α is the relative bargaining power of the fi rm, π and U are the pay-offs 
to the fi rm and the trade union, respectively, if the two parties do not reach an 
agreement. The fall back pay-off to the fi rm is:
(5)
16 Theory and Empirical Strategy
? IN aLLRR ?? ?    
? ? FLwLwaLLR IINNIN ??????   
? ?wLMLwU NNN ???    
???? ???? 1
,
** )()(),( UUargmaxLw
NN Lw
NN
FLwaLR III ??? )(?    
Hence, if there is no agreement with the trade union, the fi rm receives the profi t 
it can achieve by only employing the immigrants. For the trade union, the fall 
back pay-off is:
 (6)
From the fi rst-order conditions to the maximization problem in (4), we get 
that:
(7)
and
(8)
The condition in (7) shows that the marginal revenue of employment is equal to 
the alternative wage of native workers. Hence, the employment of native workers 
is effi cient. From this it follows that, as long as the fi rm employs native workers, 
total effective employment, L¯ = L*N + aL1, will be independent of the employment 
of immigrants. Therefore, the revenue, R = R(L), will also be independent of the 
employment of immigrants.
Now, (8) can be expressed as:
(9)
By differentiating this expression with respect to L
I
, it is now easily found that , 
so the wage of native workers is unambiguously decreasing in the 
employment of immigrants. There are two reasons for this. First, with more im-
migrants, the bargaining position of the fi rm improves, as the fall back profi t of 
the fi rm becomes higher. Second, more immigrants increase the revenue in the 
fi rm which is shared between the owners of the fi rm and the native workers.
The above argument requires immigrants and native workers to be substitutes 
in production. If they are, in fact, complements, a higher immigrant share may 
instead improve the bargaining power of native workers. This happens because 
a higher immigrant share will in this case reduce the fall back profi t of the fi rm. 
This in turn results in higher wages for native workers. As a consequence, we 
may expect different types of immigrants to have different implications for the 
wages of native workers.
In sum, the theoretical relationship of interest is given by:
(10)
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where w
ijt
 is the hourly wage rate of native worker i in workplace j at time t. 
X
it
 includes individual characteristics such as age, education, experience, and 
tenure, while the variables of interest are the workplace immigrant shares con-
tained in the vector P
jt
. Other workplace specifi c variables are contained in the 
vector Z
jt
.
3.2 Estimation
OLS estimation of (a linearised version of) the model in (10) may be biased for 
several reasons. First, unobservable fi rm characteristics may cause some fi rms 
to both pay different wages and attract more immigrants. This could be the case 
for, e.g., foreign-owned fi rms where it is well established empirically that they 
pay higher wages; see, e.g., Lipsey (2002). Alternatively, fi rms with unattract-
ive working conditions may be required to pay higher wages (as compensation) 
and may at the same time attract more immigrants, if these are less picky than 
native workers. Both of these effects should bias OLS estimates upwards, but 
should be eliminated when controlling for fi rm fi xed effects.
Second, unobservable individual characteristics may be correlated with the fi rm 
immigrant share, if certain (low-productivity) native workers select (or are se-
lected by) fi rms that also hire many immigrants. For example, production pro-
cesses that do not require advanced skills or knowledge may attract both immi-
grants and relatively low-skilled native workers, creating a negative correlation 
between immigrant share and the wages of native workers. This would bias OLS 
estimates downwards. This type of bias should, however, be eliminated with the 
inclusion of individual fi xed effects in the estimation.
Thus, we end up with the following Mincer-type specifi cation for the empiri-
cal model:
(11)
where φ
t
 is an unobservable year effect, and θ
ij
 is an unobserved effect for each 
combination of worker and workplace (a so-called job-spell fi xed effects) to cap-
ture the above mentioned unobservables.
While OLS estimation of (11) may result in biased estimates, estimation with 
fi xed effects for each worker-workplace combination implies that identifi cation 
is based on changes in the immigrant shares at a workplace over time within a 
job-spell. Here the relatively long time horizon of our panel (12 years) is very 
useful.
Finally, reverse causality may bias estimates even with fi xed effects included. 
This could happen if immigrants are attracted to fi rms that (in some periods) 
pay higher wages due to unobserved shocks. The argument should be that immi-
grants are more likely than native workers to be attracted to these fi rms, as they 
ijtijtjtjtitijt ZPXw ?????? ??????)log(  
have lower mobility costs, especially when they are settling for the fi rst time in 
a country; see Borjas (1999). Alternatively, native workers could be more like-
ly than immigrants to fl ee from fi rms receiving a negative shock to wages. Of 
course these issues bear resemblance to the discussion referred to in the intro-
duction about potential endogeneity problems created by mobility across local 
labour markets. To address this problem, we apply the instrumental variables 
strategy described in the following subsection. However, it is important to stress 
that reverse causality is only a problem if native workers and immigrants are ex-
pected to react differently to a fi rm-specifi c temporary shock to wages.
3.3 Instruments
As instruments for the different immigrant shares in fi rm j in period t, we use the 
historical immigrant shares in the fi rm corrected for the regional and the coun-
try-level developments in the different types of immigrants since then.8,9
The idea behind these instruments is that immigrants are likely to seek employ-
ment in fi rms which already employ immigrants. First, because these fi rms have 
overcome barriers associated with employing immigrants: They have changed 
their working language and have made special allowances for cultural and re-
ligious diversities, etc. Second, because of network effects among immigrants. 
Networks have previously been shown to be important for the location choices 
of immigrants as they facilitate assimilation and the job search process; see, 
e.g., Munshi (2003). Thus, it seems obvious to hypothesise that they should also 
matter for job decisions.
We interact the historical immigrant shares in the fi rms with the country level 
trends in migration. With four immigrant shares to instrument, immshare(1)-
immshare(4), this gives us four instruments for each year. Specifi cally, the in-
struments for the four immigrant shares in fi rm j in period t are given by:
(12)
where imm(x)
t
 is the total number of employed immigrants of type x in the coun-
try (or region) in year t. Thus, we are basically using the 1992 distribution of 
immigrants across fi rms to allocate the subsequent increases in immigrant em-
ployment at the regional or country level.
8. In a fi xed-effects estimation, instruments should be strictly exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated with demand 
shocks in all years in the sample. For this reason, we use the immigrant shares in the years prior to our sample 
as instruments.
9. A similar approach is taken by Cortes (2006) who instrument the number of low-skilled immigrants in a 
city with the historical number of low-skilled immigrants in that city interacted with the increase in immigra-
tion at the country level.
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The instruments are valid as long as the unobserved factors determining the 
historical immigrant shares do not affect subsequent wages. As individual and 
fi rm fi xed effects are included in the IV regressions, this is only a problem if, 
e.g., a pre-sample temporary shock to fi rm wages (prices) affects both the im-
migrant share in 1992 and wages in the sample period. I.e. the shock should last 
at least more than one year. If the shock is permanent, it will be captured by the 
fi rm fi xed effect.
To minimise the risk of long-lasting temporary shocks invalidating the instru-
ments, we also estimate the model using the 1990 shares of immigrants as al-
ternative instruments. These are much less likely to be invalid, as it would re-
quire temporary shocks to last more than 3 years. On the other hand, they may 
not predict current immigrant shares as well because fewer of the workplaces 
existed in 1990.
As yet another check on the validity of the instruments, we use the following 
alternative instruments:
(13)
where imm(x)
j,1992
 is the number of immigrants of type x in fi rm j in 1992. These 
instruments are not invalidated by native workers reacting to temporary shocks, 
as they are only based on the initial number of immigrants in the fi rm. These 
instruments are also constructed using the 1990 number of immigrants in the 
fi rm. Thus, in total we have 16 instruments for our four potentially endogenous 
regressors.
In a situation with multiple potential instruments for each potentially endogenous 
variable, we may test for relevance and validity of the instruments. Our strategy 
is as a fi rst step to include all eight instruments implementing two-stage least 
squares, since this may generate more effi cient estimates.10 Second, with respect 
to the validity requirement, we test each instrument individually using the C-sta-
tistic. If the null hypothesis that the instrument is valid is rejected, we drop the 
instrument. Third we evaluate the relevance of instruments by implementing the 
test of redundancy suggested by Hall and Peixe (2003) for each instrument.11
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10. It should be noted that our potentially endogenous regressors take values in the interval [0,1], so in prin-
ciple the fi rst stage equation is a non-linear Tobit. However, Angrist and Krueger (2001) argue that two-stage 
least squares is a robust estimation method and that consistency of the second-stage estimates does not depend 
on getting the fi rst-stage functional form right.
11. Instruments are redundant if the asymptotic effi ciency of the estimation is not improved by using them.
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4. Results
This section presents the results of the estimations. Table 4 contains the results 
of estimating three variants of the model in (11); a simple pooled OLS regres-
sion, a regression with job spell fi xed effects and a 2SLS regression with job 
spell fi xed effects. In the fi rst model, we fi nd a positive coeffi cient estimate on 
the share of immigrants from EU-15 countries, and this confi rms the fi ndings 
from the raw correlations reported in Table 3. However, immigrants from the 
other three areas are now all associated with a negative coeffi cient. This means 
that observed individual and workplace heterogeneity account for the initial 
positive correlation. For example, workplace size is well known to have a posi-
tive impact on individual wages (this is also confi rmed in our regressions) and 
workplace size is also positively correlated with immigrant shares, so failure to 
control for workplace size may create spurious correlation between wages and 
immigration shares.
Moving to the estimations containing spell fi xed effects removes the signifi cance 
of the coeffi cients for the fi rst two immigrant groups, although the coeffi cient to 
type 2 immigrants is now signifi cantly positive at the 10 percent level. Higher 
shares of immigrants from other developed countries and less developed coun-
tries are, however, still associated with a negative effect on the wages of native 
workers. More specifi cally, an increase in the share of immigrants from less de-
veloped countries of 10 percentage points reduces earnings of native workers 
by approximately 1.4 %.
The fact that spell fi xed effects remove the effects of the fi rst two immigrant 
types indicate that the OLS estimates of these can be ascribed to selection. Thus, 
the OLS estimate of immshare(1) appears to be upward biased. This could be 
due to a multinational effect: Firms with higher shares of immigrants of type 1 
are likely to be multinational fi rms. They pay higher wages and attract more of 
these immigrants. The OLS estimate of immshare(2), on the other hand, seems 
to be downward biased. Firms with many Eastern European immigrants tend to 
pay lower wages to native workers, but not as a consequence of the presence of 
Eastern European immigrants.
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Table 4. Wage Effects of Immigrants at the Workplace
Coeff. Std.error Coeff. Std.error Coeff. Std.error
Immigrant type 1 share 0,3318 0,0520 0,0276 0,0168 0,6431 0,8074
Immigrant type 2 share -0,2878 0,1022 0,0788 0,0429 1,6791 0,3645
Immigrant type 3 share -0,1623 0,0525 -0,0667 0,0212 0,1146 0,3137
Immigrant type 4 share -0,2376 0,0271 -0,1428 0,0138 -1,8241 0,2708
Method
Job spell fixed effects
Control for clustering
Note: All models include individual control variables (see Table 1), workplace control variables (see Table 2),
year fixed effects, industry fixed effects and local labour market controls in the form of fixed effects,
local labour market specific time trends and variables measuring the share of the four types of immigrants,
the share of workers with further education and basic education and the average unemployment rate.
Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5 percent level. Number of obs.: 543,089 (5 percent sample). 
2SLS
Yes
No
OLS
No
Yes
OLS
Yes
No
Moving to the IV estimations, we fi rst investigate validity and relevance of our 
16 instrument following the strategy described above. After removing invalid 
instrumental variables we end up with fi ve instruments which all pass the rele-
vance/redundancy test.12 The third model in Table 4 contains parameter estimates 
for the variables of interest in the second stage wage regression. These results 
confi rm that type 4 immigrants have a negative effect on native workers’ wages 
and the coeffi cient now increases numerically. There is no longer any effect of 
type 3 immigrants, and immigrants from Eastern Europe (type 2 immigrants) 
now have a strong positive impact on wages.13
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12. The surviving instruments are: the 1992 (eq. 12)-instruments for type 2 and type 3 immigrants, the 1990 
(eq. 12)-instrument for type 4 immigrants, the 1992 (eq. 13)-instrument for type 2 immigrants and the 1990 
(eq. 13)-instrument for type 2 immigrants.
13. The fact that this effect was not positive in the OLS estimation could be because native workers move 
away from fi rms paying low wages thereby creating a negative causal relation between wages and immigra-
tion shares and thus a negative bias in the coeffi cients.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we argue that a fruitful way to analyse the impact of immigration 
on wages is by taking a disaggregated approach, namely by studying how indi-
vidual native worker wages are affected by the use of immigrant labour at the 
workplace. In a fi rm-level bargaining model for the labour market, we illustrate 
that fi rms using immigrants may change their bargaining position towards na-
tive workers, which in turn affects wages of native workers.
Empirically, our approach, of course, calls for detailed worker-fi rm data, and we 
have access to data from the Danish labour market covering all workers and all 
workplaces for the years 1993-2004 – period with a very substantial increase in 
the infl ux of immigrants. A very robust fi nding is that fi rm with a high share of 
immigrants from less developed countries pay lower wages to native workers. 
This result holds controlling for observed worker and workplace heterogeneity, 
worker-fi rm fi xed effects and after applying instrumental variables techniques. 
We also fi nd that workers from the new EU countries from Eastern Europe tend 
to increase the wages of native workers once reverse causality is taken into ac-
count. This means that Eastern European immigrants may complement native 
workers at the workplace such that productivity and wages increase.
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